Resolving Commercial Disputes in China: Foreign Firms and the Role of Contract Law by Grow, Roy F.




Resolving Commercial Disputes in China: Foreign
Firms and the Role of Contract Law
Roy F. Grow
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Foreign Law Commons, and the
International Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Roy F. Grow, Resolving Commercial Disputes in China: Foreign Firms and the Role of Contract Law, 14 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 161
(1993-1994)
Resolving Commercial Disputes in China:
Foreign Firms and the Role of
Contract Law
Roy F. Grow*
Mr. Li felt boxed in when he thought about his meeting earlier that
morning.1 He had spent three hours with representatives of a Sino-
French joint venture and the conversation had been difficult and
inconclusive.
The French manager was incensed that the product he was manu-
facturing in Tianjin-factory-grade electrical switches-had been re-
verse-engineered by two enterprises in central China. The copied
switches resembled the French switches in every way, even down to the
French patent code numbers on the side of the housing box. Now the
copied switches were being sold across China and competing with the
French firm's products. More distressing, the quality of the copied
switches was not good because of mistakes in the manufacturing process.
One small Chinese factory that used the pirated switches had burned to
the ground because of an electrical overload. At another location, a hos-
pital generator had exploded after one of the switches had been installed,
blowing out a wall in a second floor operating room. Potential purchasers
were beginning to avoid the switches altogether-regardless of whether
they had been manufactured by the Sino-French joint venture or the pi-
rate enterprises in central China.
Mr. Li heads the Tianjin municipal ministry that had jurisdiction
over many of the commercial operations in the Tianjin Economic Devel-
opment Administration (TEDA)-a new economic zone for Sino-foreign
* Frank B. Kellogg Professor of International Relations at Carleton College in Northfield, MN.
Professor Grow works with Japanese and American firms operating in China.
I I have changed many of the names mentioned in this article at the request of the interviewees.
The situations presented are all based upon actual facts and occurrences.
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joint ventures some 20 kilometers outside the main part of the city. The
zone sits on the edge of Tonggu harbor and is one of north China's most
rapidly growing industrial centers. As more foreign firms move in, Mr.
Li's ministry group is gaining in prominence and his staff is becoming
one of the most professional and respected in the city. Li's superiors con-
sider the zone a commercial success story and a real boon for Tianjin's
economy.
The French manager had been blunt and outspoken at the meeting.
He held up one of his own switches and placed it side-by-side with one of
the pirated switches. Then he dared anyone in the room to tell which was
the real one. He showed advertisements run by one of the pirate firms
and complained that even the ads were copies of his. For dramatic em-
phasis, he showed large photographs of the burned factory and the dam-
aged operating room.
The copied switches were only the tip of an even more troublesome
iceberg, the Chinese co-manager of the joint venture said. The French
firm had contracts with other Tianjin-area suppliers for some of the basic
materials used by the joint venture. The most important of these Tianjin-
supplied materials-plastic resins-had also been diverted to the south-
ern Chinese pirate firms. The Chinese suppliers had used the French for-
mulae, manufactured the new plastics, and then sold most of their output
directly to the Chinese pirate firms.
"We have well-negotiated agreements," said the Chinese co-man-
ager, "and we thought that we had good working relationships with our
suppliers. Probably the relationships cannot be restored after these
problems. But they must give us back our formulae and they must not
use it to supply materials to our competitors. We cannot survive if we
have to compete against ourselves."
The French manager's final words were the most difficult for Mr. Li.
"We have a contract signed by you, the Tianjin municipal government,
and the ministry in Beijing. We want you to enforce this contract. Bring
suit against the pirate factories and stop their production."
Mr. Li understood the problems of the two managers and he wanted
to find a way to resolve their complaints. The success of the joint venture
was important to both the future of the development zone and to his own
career.
How to find a way through the thicket of problems? The French
manager was right-the joint venture had a contract, it had been negoti-
ated with all of the right offices, and it was based on the last two sets of
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regulations promulgated by the State Council.2 The Tianjin municipal
code governing the operation of joint ventures in the TEDA zone was
even more explicit. There was little question in Mr. Li's mind that the
French manager was correct in arguing that a contract violation had
occurred.
But using the legal system, as the French manager was insisting, did
not seem comfortable. Mr. Li later described his situation (using his old
Marxist lexicon) as a tension between theory and practice. The foreigner
believed in his contract and in the rule of law; he was familiar with court
systems in Europe and he knew how to be an effective advocate. But
Chinese practice was based on a different set of working assumptions. To
rely on written law to enforce behavior, said the Analects, was never as
important as proper behavior itself; falling back on legal code was evi-
dence that people and their government had failed Although Mr. Li did
not think of himself as a Confucian scholar, he still harbored a strong
feeling that attempting to resolve a contract problem through the court
system could only result in more trouble for everyone.4
It is not my intention to explicate China's Foreign Economic Con-
tract Law (FECL), the Joint Venture Law (JVL), or the Foreign Enter-
prise Income Tax Law (FEITL). The analysis of these codes has been
done in great detail by others.' Instead, I will examine the actual behav-
2 In previous studies I have described and analyzed the procedures used in China to acquire,
assimilate, and utilize foreign goods and technologies. I have argued that this process is shaped by
(1) a multi-tiered process that includes a number of distinct and separate stages, and (2) a group of
key players whose activities shape the workings of the different stages. See Roy F. Grow, In Search
of Excellence in China's Industrial Sector: The Chinese Enterprise and Foreign Technology, in
CHINA'S ECONOMIC DILEMMAS IN THE 1990's: THE PROBLEMS OF REFORMS, MODERNIZATION,
AND INTERDEPENDENCE (Joint Economic Committee, U. S. Government Printing Office 1991). See
also the case studies in OTTO SCHNEPP ET AL., UNITED STATES-CHINA TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
(1990).
3 See Steven K. Hazen, Good Business Sense" Changing Practice in the People's Republic of
China, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 583 (1987); David A. Hayden, The Role of Contract
Law in Developing the Chinese Legal Culture, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 571 (1987).
4 For Chinese views, see Hugh T. Scogin, Between Heaven and Man: Contract and the State in
Han Dynasty China, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1325 (1990); Gao Xi-Ching, Today's Legal Thinking and Its
Impact in China, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1989).
5 There are a series of accounts that have outlined the general framework of the Chinese For-
eign Economic Contract Law (FECL). Among the most insightful analysts is Preston M. Torbert.
See, eg., Preston M. Torbert, New Implementing Rules on Technology Import Contracts, 10 E.
ASIAN EXEcUTIVE REP. 20 (1988). See also RICHARD J. GOOSEN, BUSINESS LAW AND PRACTICE
IN THE PRC (1987); Wil Armstrong, The Development of Commercial Law for Foreign Investment in
China, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 55 (1989); Gary Watson, Business Law in the People's Republic of
China, 1978-1989, 27 AM. Bus. L. J. 315 (1989); Zhao Yan, A Comparative Study of the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, 93
COM. L. J. 63 (1988); Henry Zheng, A Comparative Analysis of the Foreign Economic Contract Law
of the People's Republic of China, 3 CHINA L. REP. 227 (1986).
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ior of the most important actors governed by this set of laws-the Chi-
nese and foreign enterprises that work with one another and which must
find ways to resolve their competing claims.6 In this study, I will examine
the tension between Chinese and foreign firms by focusing on several spe-
cific and limited questions having to do with actual practice: How do
Chinese enterprises form contractual relationships with one another?
How useful is China's relatively young and underdeveloped body of com-
mercial law and precedent in resolving disputes between Chinese enter-
prises? How much can this body of law and regulation be relied upon by
foreign firms who interact with Chinese enterprises?7
I will approach these questions by examining the behavior of the
most important actors in this arena-the Chinese and foreign enterprises
which have formed contract relationships. The data used in the body of
this paper are drawn from a long-term research project that began in the
early 1980's. In the course of more than a dozen years of work investigat-
ing more than 65 Japanese and 45 American firms involved in China, I
have worked with or interviewed several hundred corporate and govern-
ment officials who have been closely involved in these projects. Most of
these interviews took place over an extended period of time, and in a
number of cases I worked as a consultant for the companies or became
involved in the corporate planning process. I have been able to follow
most of these projects for a number of years and in some cases the record
extends back over a decade. Altogether, my study includes almost 250
different projects with as many Chinese enterprises.8
I have used a small subset of my larger data base for the analysis in
this paper. From my larger group of case studies, I have chosen 32 differ-
ent Chinese enterprises that were involved in some sort of commercial
dispute-either with their foreign partner or with another Chinese firm.
Sometimes these conflicts were small and limited, involving, say, nothing
more than a disagreement over the timing of a payment. Other conflicts
were more visceral and threatened the basic relationship between the en-
terprises themselves. All had one thing in common: both foreign and
6 I have written elsewhere in detail about the ways that foreign and Chinese enterprises interact
with one another during the earlier stages of their commercial relationship. See, e.g., Roy F. Grow,
Acquiring Foreign Technology: What Makes The Transfer Process Work?, in SCIENCE AND TECH-
NOLOGY IN POST-MAO CHINA (Merle Goldman & Denis Simon eds., 1989).
7 For a recent statement on the kinds of frustration that builds up between foreign and Chinese
managers see Party of the First Part: China Tries to Improve Contract Law, 156 FAR E. ECON. REV.
42 (1993); Clement Shum, Companies With Foreign Equity Participation in China, 10 J. Bus. L. 185
(1991).
8 Roy F. Grow, Comparing American and Japanese Technology Transfers in China: Assessing
the "Fit' Between Foreign Firms and Chinese Enterprises, in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS (1991).
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Chinese managers had difficulty finding an appropriate arena for resolv-
ing their conflicts.
What Mr. Li faced as he looked for a way of helping the joint ven-
ture under his jurisdiction is a problem that is at the heart of China's
utilization of contract law and commercial regulation today. While
China's reform policies have created an increasingly elaborate and com-
plex body of law, many of the key players in the Chinese economy-both
individuals and enterprises-are ill-equipped to use these new methods.9
In the following pages, I will outline some of the reasons why this is the
case.
I. THE ENTERPRISE IN CHINA'S NEW COMMERCIAL SYSTEM
China has literally re-invented itself during the last decade and a
half. The central allocation mechanism is gone: the old State Planning
Commission that in the past exercised authority over the flow of virtually
all of China's inputs and outputs now oversees only two dozen prices-
primarily in areas of energy, precious metals, and transportation. The big
Beijing ministries are now little more than loose bureaucratic shells and
real decision-making authority has shifted to provincial, county, munici-
pal, and township level agencies. Even the authority to levy and collect
taxes has moved to local levels and China today has no real equivalent of
the American national Internal Revenue Service.
No communist society's economy has grown more rapidly than
China's. Beginning with the 1978-79 reforms, the Chinese economy has
emerged-in the space of fifteen years-as the fastest growing in the
world. Many economists now believe that past estimates of the econ-
omy's size and its rate of growth severely underestimated what has oc-
curred. Instead of the $400 per capita output used in our old estimates,
many analysts now argue that a more accurate per capita figure is some-
where between $2,000 and $4,000.10 Total output, other analysts argue,
is now more in the range of $1.5 trillion, pushing China past Hong Kong,
Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore (and perhaps even Japan) as the center of
gravity for East Asian commercial development.
A. THE NEW CHINESE ENTERPRISE
Immense growing pains have accompanied this rapid growth. The
Chinese reform movement's emphasis on economic decentralization, en-
9 See Clement Shum, Contractual Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China, 11 Bus. L.
REv. 272 (1990).
10 See the description of the recent reevaluation of Chinese output data in When China Wakes,
THE ECONOMIST (Supp.), November 28, 1992, at 1-16.
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terprise autonomy, and entrepreneurial authority has been accompanied
by a fitful movement toward a new system of commercial relationships.
The real centers of gravity in the new Chinese economy are the en-
terprises and their managers. It is inside the enterprise that the most im-
portant economic and commercial decisions are now made and it is the
managers of these enterprises who are the most important links in the
web that is responsible for China's rapid economic growth.11 Many of
these enterprises, however, have been cast adrift in a sea of new commer-
cial relationships; they have been left almost on their own to forge new
strategies in what seems-at least to many Chinese managers-a trial
and error world.
Consider Guangming Appliance Factory #1. The Shanghai factory
makes a range of small appliances including a sleek aluminum cased
toaster oven that has become one of the smash commercial hits in
China's booming consumer economy. In both the large cities and the
cash-rich countryside of central China, people use Guangming's toaster
ovens for a variety of tasks that range from heating simple traditional
foods to preparing prepackaged off-the-shelf meals.
Manager Wang has been Guangming's director since the mid-
1980's. His job has changed almost entirely during this period. In the
past, the manager of the appliance factory lived in a world governed by
central allocation: targets were set by higher authorities, resources were
distributed by a series of interlocking local and national agencies and
output was spoken for years in advance-almost regardless of quality or
price. The most valuable commodity a manager could bring to an enter-
prise was "contacts with the heavens": an ability to get along with
higher-ups who could provide all of the things that meant success or
failure for an enterprise-more personnel, lower targets, increased pay
for workers, and new equipment.
Now Manager Wang's world is completely different. At almost
every level of Chinese commercial activity-from the provincial-level
state factories to the independent and energetic township enterprises-
the real center of administrative and decision-making authority has
shifted away from the ministries and to the enterprise itself. Today Man-
ager Wang's daily activities more closely resemble those of an American
executive than they do those of a 1980's Chinese manager. Most of his
day is spent overseeing the "three great needs": finding inputs for his
11 For a study on how this new managerial center of gravity came about, see Roy F. Grow,
Japanese and American Firms in China: Lessons of a New Market, 21 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 49
(1986).
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production, monitoring the factory operations, and keeping on schedule
the output that goes to his customers.
Finding his own inputs is a new task for Manager Wang and he
spends a considerable amount of time figuring out who can supply them
and how much they will cost. Increasingly, the ministries and agencies
leave these tasks to Wang himself. Now his aluminum casings come from
one supplier, his copper wiring from another, a small chip that regulates
temperature and timing from a third, a set of plastic knobs from a fourth,
and printed packaging material from a fifth.
Monitoring all of the things needed to keep his factory going-over
and above the inputs needed to produce the toaster ovens-is equally
complex. Most difficult to arrange are what Wang calls "social-use per-
mits": state and local tax forms, environmental use statements, and
building permits. Each comes from a different agency and each must be
approved using a different procedure. Then there is water, electricity,
truck transportation, and machine maintenance products. Again, each
comes from a separate source and each is negotiated through a separate
set of procedures.
The customer/end-user side is equally complex. Gone are the days
when a manager could assume that all of the enterprise's output would
be claimed by one or two end-users who worked through a state plan.
Now, Manager Wang himself manages the sales and distribution of his
product. His representatives fan out across the province and they have
strong commercial relationships with almost a dozen different distribu-
tion agencies and department stores. The enterprise arranges its own
transportation, prints its own brochures, and collects its own sales re-
ceipts. The factory is even organizing an after-market repair facility for
the area's increasingly savvy consumers.
Wang thus lives in a complex world of inputs, production processes,
and outputs that he and his staff manage and worry about. The success
or failure of an enterprise increasingly falls on the shoulders of the man-
ager and his staff, rather than on some "higher Chinese authority" as had
been so common in the past.
B. NEGOTIATING A CONTRACT
Each of Guangming's inputs and outputs is negotiated, not com-
manded, and each is governed by a complex set of personal relationships
and formal rules.12
12 Xu Guojian, Contract in Chinese Private International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 648
(1989).
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Chart 1
The Central Role of the Enterprise
Suplie
Guangminh Appliance Eniterprise 1
Consider Manager Wang's struggle to find an input as simple as the
plastic knobs and handles for the toaster ovens. The search began when
the enterprise's chief engineers agreed on the final design for the new
toaster oven model. The marketing staff had argued that the knobs and
handles-along with the aluminum casing and the glass front-would be
the oven's primary selling point.
After setting the design, the staff turned to the question of sourcing.
Some argued that the knobs should be made in-house-the work could
be given to some of the underemployed women in the work unit. Others
argued for the simplicity of a purchase agreement. Hire the job out, one
staff member argued, and you won't have to worry about finding all of
the raw materials, maintaining the quality of the molds, and using the
right finishing compounds.
The production staff shopped their design to three different enter-
prises in the area and then narrowed the decision down to a single firm.
Manager Wang sent a representative to the supplier and they talked
about prices, quantities, and delivery schedules. The general outline of a
satisfactory agreement was completed in an afternoon's conversation.
The actual contract with this supplying enterprise was worked out
under the direction of a province-level negotiating team. The team facili-
tated several discussions between representatives of the two factories,
wrote a brief letter of understanding that was signed by representatives
from both sides, and then sketched out a draft contract. This draft con-
tract began with a standard boiler plate cover that outlined a series of
general propositions governing commercial relationships in the province.
Then the contract went on to stipulate-in a few short paragraphs for
Contract Law in China
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each category-design, quantity, quality, delivery dates, and method of
payment.
The draft document went to each of the Chinese enterprises and a
few changes were made by each side. Then the revised draft was sent to a
province-level board for review and it was amended again. Finally, after
nine weeks of discussions and negotiation, the contract was signed by
both factory managers.
Manager Wang followed this procedure for each of his toaster
oven's inputs and outputs. There were times when Wang had time to
reflect on how different his job had become in a decade; in the 1980's he
and his enterprise would have been more of a passive instrument-re-
ceiving inputs negotiated by outside agencies and using prices set by
others to balance his books. Now it is Wang who sits at the very center of
the process and his "supervising agencies" have been turned into centers
of review and approval, rather than the instigators of action.
C. CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS
The enterprise manager's world is complicated by the changing role
of the old agencies and ministries of the state economy. Although the
days of direct management, allocation, and supervision are long gone, the
ministries still claim a sort of general jurisdictional oversight responsibil-
ity, and there remain a series of loose administrative boundaries and loy-
alties that cut across almost every Chinese commercial transaction.
The State Council and the State Planning Commission, for example,
still engage in a planning exercise that sets general guidelines and priori-
ties for a five-year period. Most analysts argue that the charting of this
plan is more a political exercise than an effort at rational and long-term
planning. Almost always-as in the case of the document worked out in
1990-the guidelines lay out a series of national priorities, and these pri-
orities become one of the means used by the Beijing and provincial minis-
tries to debate national policies and influence the nature and pace of
economic development.
The national planning exercise has important local consequences for
managers such as Wang, since it sets out a series of general guidelines for
the central ministries and then encourages the ministries to push for im-
plementation. In the most recent plan, for example, there was general
agreement that the Chinese economy needed infrastructure development,
that certain categories of production (such as alloy steel) continue to
need "guidance," that energy was a major priority, and that the next
important step in the reform process was the development of a nation-
wide social security safety net.
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These general priorities work their way through the commercial sys-
tem in a variety of ways. The most important consequence involves the
ways that China's enterprises bid on scarce resources and the ways that
conflicts between enterprises competing for these resources are resolved.
For example, many small enterprises are able to make a good case to a
local office of one of the nationally chartered banks for loans if their com-
mercial plans and expansion projects fit one of the general priorities in
the five-year plan. The local rail transport agency, for example, can make
a strong claim on the People's Bank for hard currency to buy switching
equipment from Germany, and argue that their needs outweigh those of,
for instance a small consumer-goods enterprise that wants to buy new
equipment from Japan. 13
The bank's decision on loans for rail equipment will have ripple ef-
fects in other areas. Requests for space on China's over-burdened rail
system might be ranked by a local transportation enterprise official ac-
cording to the general priorities of the Plan; should a request to ship
toaster ovens, say, rank above a similar request to ship telephone line
equipment. Similarly, a request for an exemption from China's increas-
ingly complex environmental regulations might be weighed in terms of
these general needs, or permission to set up a sales office in another prov-
ince might become enmeshed in decisions about relative importance of
using aluminum for toaster ovens as opposed to airplanes.
Many observers argue that the big Beijing ministries have, in effect,
transformed themselves from agencies of direct administration and con-
trol into organizations of guidance, influence, and coordination. While
the big ministries no longer exert direct control over the flow of resources
and commodities, they continue to wield administrative influence and
often use this influence to support the enterprises, projects and managers
they consider to be within their nominal jurisdiction.
The fact that Mr. Wang deals with suppliers and end-users that cut
across these vague jurisdictional boundaries makes his role more difficult.
For example, during the past year Mr. Wang found himself caught
squarely in the middle of a dispute between one of his suppliers and one
of his best customers that cut across such a jurisdictional line.
The dispute involved the aluminum casings Mr. Wang uses for his
toaster ovens. He buys these casings from a factory that is nominally
under the general jurisdiction of the national Ministry of Light Industry.
The aluminum casing factory has the authority to sign its own contracts,
hire its own labor, and make changes in its production technologies. But
13 See the ripple effects of such cases described in David A. Sneider, The Baoshan Debacle: A
Study in Sino-Japanese Contract Dispute Settlement, 18 N.Y.U. . INT'L L. & POL. 541 (1986).
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Chart 2
Competing Jurisdictions of Enterprise Partners
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the aluminum casing factory asked for help from the central ministry
when it needed additional funds to complete an expansion project in
1991. The national ministry, in effect, co-signed the local enterprise's
loan application and used its deposits in the Bank of China as a sort of
collateral. In return, the casing factory signed on to a separate project
sponsored by the ministry; it agreed to supply pressings for another fac-
tory that was making a product that would be exported to the Philip-
pines. The Philippine-bound product would, in turn, earn foreign
currency for the Beijing ministry which could be used for yet another set
of projects.
On the other hand, one of Manager Wang's best customers is a
Shanghai department store that is that city's major outlet for consumer
appliances. The department store, however, is under the jurisdiction of
the Shanghai Municipal Commercial Authority which charters its sales
operations, issues its commercial permits, and receives its tax payments.
Manager Wang's problem came from a series of complaints brought
to him by the department store's sales representative. The casings on one
of the toaster-oven models were "popping"-bulging out and cracking
when used for a long time at a high temperature. There had been some
serious damage from several of the popping episodes and the department
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store's customers wanted compensation-both for the toaster ovens and
for the damages caused by the appliances.
Mr. Wang looked to the casing factory to stand behind its products
and compensate the department store customers. But the factory man-
ager denied that his factory was responsible. He argued that his "super-
vising agency"r-the Ministry of Light Industry-had set up guidelines
that regulated the extent of his liability. He noted that Wang had known
about these regulations since a ministry representative had been present
during the contract negotiations and had noted these provisions in the
final version of the contract. He argued that since the casings were made
to Wang's specifications, since no complaint had been received from
Wang's factory after delivery, and since the casings worked nicely in
other models, he was not responsible-as his ministry's guidelines
noted-for the department store customer's damages. He showed Wang
the series of regulations from his ministry and argued that he had no
further responsibility in the affair.
The manager of the department store argued in a similar fashion.
The manager showed Wang a set of guidelines from his municipal minis-
try that made the sellers of a product-both the direct seller of the fin-
ished product and the manufacturer of the subassembly parts-
responsible for the quality of the items they manufactured and liable for
damages these products caused. The Shanghai municipal code that gov-
erned this type of complaint, he argued, made the original producer lia-
ble for damages; the aluminum casing factory clearly had the
responsibility to reply to his customer's complaints and offer appropriate
compensation.
II. RESOLVING CONTRACT DISPUTES
Manager Wang thus found himself caught between two ministries
with different jurisdictional responsibilities, two enterprises that based
their operation on different sets of regulations, and two managers who
were not about to give in to each other. Wang confronted a problem
increasingly familiar to almost every entrepreneurial Chinese enterprise
manager as the old state relationships broke down: his old recourse-
asking a supervising ministry for resolution-was now almost completely
gone. 14
Wang surveyed the different courses of action that were available to
him. His first option was to try to handle the affair himself. He could call
14 For an overview of some of this earlier practice, see Wang Guiguo, A Survey of China!; Eco-
nomic Contract Law, 3 CHINA L. REP. 259 (1986); Henry Zheng, A Comparative Analysis of the
Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, 3 CHINA L. REP. 227 (1986).
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the manager of the aluminum casing factory, perhaps meet with him over
a meal, and try to work out some sort of a compromise that would be
acceptable to both of them. This seemed an option without teeth; all of
the phone calls and meetings to this point had not changed the other
manager's actions. Further, if the meetings did not work, not only would
the department store's customers remain unsatisfied, but Wang's rela-
tionship with one of his most important suppliers would be
jeopardized. 5
Another option was to rely on the People's Court system-a series
of local and provincial commercial courts that handled "economic
problems" for Chinese enterprises. Once before, Wang had worked his
way through this process and it seemed excruciatingly slow and complex.
First came trips to the local procurate office to detail the nature of the
grievance. Wang had been interviewed by two young men who cross-
examined his statements and demanded supporting documents for all of
the claims. A long two month waiting period followed, when nothing at
all seemed to be going on. Finally the local officials published their deci-
sion-unfavorable in Wang's case-and added a requirement that Man-
ager Wang pay the costs of the court hearings as well as the penalties
levied in the case.16
Wang's final option was "administrative persuasion" that used in-
formal discussions through a series of intermediaries to settle disputes.17
In Wang's province, such intermediaries are usually named beforehand
during the contract negotiation stage. They can be representatives from
one of the agencies that oversees the enterprise, a "neutral" representa-
tive from a local government organ, or a senior ministry official from
Beijing or the provincial capital. 8 In the best of circumstances, these
outside representatives play a sort of mediating role; they bring the par-
ties together, get some factual information on the table, and push the
parties toward an agreement. If the process fails, however, the decision of
the mediators is final and, at least in some parts of China, there is no
appeal.
Manager Wang had used this method once before in a dispute with
the supplier of his packaging materials. Wang had ordered a supply of
15 See Peter V. Smilde & Viveca Y. Tung, Conciliation of Commercial Disputes in the People's
Republic of China, 4 CANw.-AM. L. J. 43 (1988).
16 For another description see Phyllis L. Chang, Deciding Disputes: Factors That Guide Chinese
Courts in the Adjudication of Rural Responsibility Contract Disputes, 52 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
101 (1989).
17 Gao Yongfu, Economic Contract Laws in China, 21 U.S.F. L. Rv. 317 (1987).
18 Tim N. Logan, The People's Republic of China and the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods, 5 CHINA L. REP. 53 (1988).
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Table 1
Where Commercial Disputes are Settled
Through Through Through Total
Informal Administrative the Court Number of
Channels Channels System Cases
Disagreement w/ Suppliers
Delivery problems 8 6 1 15
Schedule problems 9 3 1 13
Quantity problems 5 3 0 8
Payment problems 15 6 5 26
Disagreement w/ End-Users
Delivery problems 13 3 2 18
Schedule problems 10 1 1 12
Quantity problems 5 1 6
Payment problems 14 3 4 21
Disputes about Support/ Infrastructure 4 2 2 8
Dispute about Intellectual Property 3 1 3 7
92 30 19 141
boxes and put down a large down payment to guarantee the order. How-
ever, the box factory had not shipped his supplies and Wang had been
forced to deliver his toaster ovens by wrapping them in blankets and
transporting them in the back seat of the company car. After a series of
meetings with a mediating team, the two factories had worked out a new
schedule that brought boxes to Manager Wang in two weeks.
Wang decided to use the mediation method in his dispute with the
aluminum casing factory and he sent in the papers that constituted a
formal application for outside involvement. The first meetings had been
devoted to gathering information about the case. The mediators met with
each factory manager separately, read the contracts, and examined the
production and delivery schedules. The sessions with the manager of the
casing factory had not gone well, however; after the first meeting, the
casing factory manager stopped coming and sent only a low-level staff
member.
The mediators agreed with Wang that the casing factory was re-
sponsible, in part, for the "popping" of the oven casings. They concluded
that the casings sent to Manager Wang's factory were actually copied
from a design used by a different model of oven, rather than from Wang's
specifications. They agreed that the casing factory, not the department
store, should answer the complaints of the department store's customers.
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Then they worked out a strategy to pressure the casing supplier-
who continued to boycott the meetings-into action. First, the mediators
placed a sort of attachment on the casing factory's bank account. "If the
manager doesn't come around," one of the mediators said, "we will sim-
ply transfer some of his assets to your account. But he is most likely to
come in and see what the problem is. When he does, we will hold another
meeting and see if we can work through the issue again. You should have
a resolution in two weeks."
Wang would later talk about the process with a chuckle. "It worked
for me this time," Wang said, "because I knew one of the mediators. We
had gone through training school together. If he had not been a friend, I
don't know how the case would have turned out."
Wang's story about the search for a way to resolve contract disputes
is not an unusual one. China in the mid-1990's still lacks a well-estab-
lished and workable system of dispute resolution. The old ministry rela-
tionships have been torn down and conflicts are no longer handled
through the old bureaucratic command system. A new commercial code
is slowly coming into being and some areas-like Tianjin, Shanghai, and
Shenzhen-are far ahead of other parts of the nation.
Most Chinese managers prefer not to use the more formal legal sys-
tem.19 They tend to rely instead on the older, highly personalistic
processes that are more deeply rooted in Chinese organizational culture.
As most of the participants in this process readily admit, the advantage
(and the final decision) quite often goes to the manager who has a per-
sonal relationship with one of the members of the mediating team.
Table 1 outlines the findings of a simple survey about the resolution
of contract disputes among Chinese enterprises. The thirty-two Chinese
enterprises in this survey were involved in a series of disputes which had
reached a point of standoff; communication had broken down and the
participants were faced with the choice of either giving up the matter
altogether or finding an outside method of conflict resolution.
By Western standards, most of these cases would have found their
way into some formal part of the legal system. In China's new commer-
cial world, however, the overwhelming tendency is to use the more infor-
mal and personalistic process. As with Manager Wang, the managers of
most Chinese enterprises tend to avoid the more formal and impersonal
economic court system.
19 John A. Spanogle, Jr. & Tibor M. Baranski, Jr., Chinese Commercial Dispute Resolution
Methods: The State Commercial and Industrial Administration Bureau, 35 AM. J. CoMP. L. 761
(1987).
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III. DispuTEs BETWEEN FOREIGN FIRMs AND CHINESE
ENTERPRISES
Nominally, foreign firms in China are governed by a set of commer-
cial rules and regulations that outline their status and legal responsibili-
ties, trade relations, intellectual property rights, and contract procedures.
In theory, these laws and regulations appear to grant foreign firms a
unique position in the Chinese economy and they offer an important set
of contractual and operational safeguards for these firms.20 Foreign man-
agers often enter the China market assuming that their joint venture or
direct sales operation has a special and privileged position in China's
commercial world.
In practice, the foreign enterprise must fit into the larger Chinese
commercial system's set of inputs, production functions, and outputs.
Foreign firms in China thus become a part of the same complex system of
personalistic relationships, competing lines of jurisdictional authority,
and changing roles that govern other Chinese enterprises.2"
Mr. Li's problems with the French joint venture illustrate this point.
Although the formal legal status of the French joint venture is different
than that of its local Chinese counterparts, in practice every dispute be-
tween a foreign firm and a Chinese enterprise has to work its way
through the system of parallel jurisdictional arenas, cross-cutting baili-
wicks, and competing local and provincial legal codes.
For the French manager of the joint venture, the situation seemed
fairly straight forward. Why not determine what jurisdiction the pirate
factories fell under, bring charges, and let the process work its way
through the Chinese court system? The French manager argued that this
was the process spelled out in his joint venture contract.22 "I have three
choices," he said, pointing to the contract. "I can use a mediation and
conciliation, go to arbitration, or use the court system. I think that the
court system will work best, since China does not want the publicity of a
court case that will hit the international media."
To Mr. Li, however, the case was more complex. He was not wor-
ried so much about whether the French manager was right or wrong, or
whether the joint venture had a contract that had been approved by the
20 Note the discussion in Stanley B. Lubman, Investment and Export Contracts in the People's
Republic of China: Perspectives on Evolving Patterns, 3 B.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1988).
21 Eldon H. Reiley & Hu Run Fu, Doing Business in China after Tiananmen Square: The Impact
of Chinese Contract Law and the UN. Convention of Sale of Goods on Sino-American Business Trans-
actions, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 25 (1989).
22 Note the procedures described in Tim N. Logan, The People's Republic of China and the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Formation Questions, 5
CHINA L. REP. 53 (1988).
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proper authorities. Technically, Mr. Li believed, the French manager
was correct in all of the statements and charges he had made.
Mr. Li was more concerned about whether or not the impasse could
be resolved at all, given the relationship between the different Chinese
enterprises, the boundaries between their administrative jurisdictions,
and the absence of some mechanism of enforcement that crossed these
boundaries.23
The problem, Mr. Li said later, was that there was no clear line of
responsibility between his office-which was part of TEDA and the
Tianjin municipal authority-and the French manager's supplier of
plastic resins. The resin supplier was directly subordinate to a Beijing
ministry while the pirate firm that bought the resins was linked to a pro-
vincial-level organization. Too many administrative lines had been
broached, he thought, and there was no political entity or law-enforce-
ment mechanism that could cross the lines to resolve the dispute.
A. Problem Sources
Foreign managers of joint ventures in China often lay on Chinese
commercial law the responsibility for resolving contractual disputes be-
23 Stanley R. Arnold, With a Client in China, 87 CoM. L. J. 170 (1982).
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tween their organizations and Chinese enterprises. Most Chinese observ-
ers, however, believe that the source of such problems is more often
located in the first steps taken by the foreign firm in establishing its
China operation. Mr. Li had once asked the French manager why the
foreign firm had picked that particular Chinese enterprise to make the
resin material. The French manager replied that there had been a combi-
nation of factors responsible for the decision and that the most important
were an introduction by a Hong Kong consulting firm, the looks of the
Chinese factory itself and, most importantly, the low price that the Chi-
nese manager offered.
Mr. Li hesitated before he asked what he considered the most im-
portant questions: "Did you know the lines of administrative authority
for all of the enterprises you were dealing with? Did you look for any sort
of relationship between the different firms?"'24
The French manager looked a little angry. "Why should I be wor-
ried about relationships? Doesn't Chinese law apply equally to all of the
parties involved in my contract?"
It was the answer Mr. Li feared most. He had been involved in so
many cases of this sort; foreigners read China's joint venture law and see
the outlines of a process for conflict resolution that includes a series of
mediators, arbiters, and procurates. It all seems clear and straight for-
ward.25 Yet the process outlined in these commercial regulations did not
come close to the reality that Mr. Li had to administer, and he had seen
many joint ventures looking for a formal means of conflict resolution
where none really existed.
Many Chinese managers and officials note that Japanese business-
men tend to carry out their negotiations in a much different manner.
Japanese businessmen take longer to work out the contract itself and
often insist on greater precision than their American and European coun-
terparts. However, the logic of the Japanese negotiating strategy-what
many Japanese business teams really try to accomplish in their negotia-
tion sessions-is much different. Japanese negotiating teams focus almost
exclusively on building a series of inter-personal relationships with their
Chinese counterparts: they spend more time than their American and
European competitors trying to understand their partner's problems and
attempting to work their way through the network of formal and infor-
24 Note the account in Denny F. Wong & Christopher G. Oechsli, Getting a Binding Contract:
Legal Status and Authority of Chinese Enterprises and Their Representatives; How Foreigners Can
Determine Who They Are Dealing With, 11 E. ASIAN EXECUTiVE REP. 9 (1989).
25 An Chen, Why Some Sino-Foreign Economic Contracts are Void and How to Prevent Voidness,
23 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 679 (1987).
Contract Law in China
14:161 (1993)
mal relationships that enmesh every Chinese enterprise.2 6 Even after
their carefilly negotiated contract is completed, the Japanese partners in
a joint venture operation almost never pursue litigation in the Chinese
court system.
Mr. Li had watched many times as a Japanese joint venture rejected
one potential supplier after another, and he had admired the ability of
Japanese negotiators to penetrate the relationship issues. He believed that
Europeans and Americans, on the other hand, tended to focus more on
technical details such as the kinds of equipment that were needed and the
methods of payment. He had once heard an American engineer comment
on the old aphorism that all Chinese looked alike. Mr. Li supposed that
the same held true for Chinese enterprises-they all looked alike to for-
eigners and the quality that distinguished one from the other, in foreign
eyes, had to do with production functions and cost.
The French manager, for example, stated that he had located the
joint venture in the TEDA zone for several reasons. The most important
factors, he said, had to do with the area's infrastructure. The zone had its
own source of electricity and this freed the enterprises in the zone from
the periodic blackouts that hit other parts of the Tianjin area. In addi-
tion, the zone was near Tonggu harbor--one of China's best deep-water
ports. The supplies and machinery needed for the factory could be moved
in quickly and export production could be shipped out easily, avoiding
China's overcrowded rail system. Most important, said the French man-
ager, was the fact that TEDA had been given special economic zone sta-
tus. In the manager's mind, his firm was thus also granted a special
status; it would be subject to a different set of regulations and taxes
would be assessed at a rate different than for firms outside the zone.
A second set of factors had to do with "cost." Mr. Li had partici-
pated in a number of joint venture negotiations and foreigners (Ameri-
cans in particular) seemed totally engrossed in issues having to do with
relative price. These foreign firms spend most of their negotiating ses-
sions working through the costs of their Chinese inputs and their con-
stant struggle was to find the lowest cost supplier. The underlying
assumption seemed to be that once a contractual agreement about price
had been agreed upon, the most important part of the negotiation had
been completed.
Absent in almost all of the American and European negotiations
was any attempt to sort out the relationships between the various Chi-
nese enterprises or to understand the different administrative and juris-
26 Grow, supra note 11, at 54-56.
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dictional boundaries that shaped their actions. Looking back at the
negotiation sessions he had witnessed, Mr. Li observed that a major part
of the problem faced by foreign managers lay not with Chinese law, but
in the way they saw their position in the Chinese commercial world.
They believed, correctly, that Chinese foreign contract law and the joint
venture regulations gave foreign firms a kind of special status in China.
But one of the most common failings of foreign managers was to extend
this view of their own special status to their relationships with Chinese
suppliers and customers. Their working assumption most often was that
the suppliers and customers operated according to the same rules and
based their activities on the same logic as did the foreign firms that en-
joyed special joint venture status.
In fact, most Chinese enterprises--even those that have contractual
relationships with foreign joint venture partners-continue to operate in
the vague world of incomplete contract law and murky cross-cutting ad-
ministrative lines of authority. Once a foreign manager steps outside the
protected bubble of his special status and forms a commercial relation-
ship with a Chinese enterprise, he makes himself subject to all of the
pressures faced by domestic Chinese enterprises.
B. Problem Solutions: Rules for Successful Foreign Managers
The world of foreign commercial activity in China is filled with suc-
cess stories and American firms are among the strongest; Otis Elevator,
Proctor and Gamble, Campbell Soup, Cargill, Nike, and Foxboro are
only a few of the most prominent examples. These American successes
are matched by an equal number of Japanese firms; Suntory, Toyota,
Matshushita, Mitsibishi, and Ajinomoto have all established an impor-
tant presence in the new China market.
The Japanese and American success stories are more similar than
they are different and managers in all of these firms tell long and involved
tales about their China operations. When pressed about the factors that
separate them from their less successful competitors, they usually offer a
very short list of reasons for their success that have to do with the ways
they settle potential or actual disputes with Chinese enterprises and agen-
cies. Of all of the factors that managers and analysts have mentioned, the
following "rules" are most often mentioned by successful foreign manag-
ers in the China market.
Rule 1: Contract law continues to play a supporting and peripheral role
in Chinese commercial conflict resolution
Successful foreign managers almost always express surprise at just
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how far Chinese commercial law has developed during the past decade.
"When I came here in the early 1980's," one foreign manager stated,
"there was almost no commercial code, no court system I could use, and
no one to talk to about my problems outside the ministries. Now there is
good commercial law in almost every part of China."
Nonetheless, say these same managers, foreign firms that rely on
this new contract law as their primary means of conflict resolution are
almost certain to fail. "Chinese contract law is fine if you have certain
kinds of problems-such as the expatriation of profits. But it is of little
use in resolving a conflict with your Chinese suppliers and customers."
Rule 2: Central government ministries are not centers
of conflict resolution
Successful foreign managers in the China market argue that the last
place they look for help in conflict resolution is in the big Beijing minis-
tries and the agencies of the State Council. Newcomers are often fooled
by these government organs, successful foreign managers argue. The
newcomer sees a big building, watches the bureaucrats promulgate regu-
lations, and makes the (incorrect) assumption that in those ministries lies
the power to make the system work.
"The best advice I could give a newcomer to China," said one
American manager, "is to avoid the Beijing ministries altogether. The
real action is where your factory and its suppliers are located. If you
can't make it work at the local level, you can't make it work at all. If
your contracts are not well-negotiated on the local level, and if you have
not sorted out your local relationships, no Beijing bureaucrat can make it
work for you."
Rule 3: Contract negotiation is primarily a relationship-building process
Chinese observers are constantly surprised at the importance for-
eigners attach to the most straightforward and mechanical parts of a
contract negotiation. Foreigners-Americans in particular-spend the
greatest amount of their time negotiating "hardware" issues (machinery,
parts) and price.
For both Chinese managers and the most successful foreign negotia-
tors, the signing of a contract represents a plateau in the development of
a relationship, not the completion of a discrete phase of the project.
The most successful foreign managers note that the contract negoti-
ation is a process that allows the two sides to know one another, under-
stand one another's genealogy, and begin the building of a longer term
relationship. As one Chinese manager argued, "Negotiating a contract is
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like putting tea on the table. It facilitates the social interaction but it does
not substitute for the actions themselves. It is the same with a contract
negotiation: once the contract is negotiated, it has lost its use. It is simply
a means to something more important."
Rule 4: Conflict resolution is almost always accomplished
through non-formal channels
As the Chinese system changes and evolves, most successful foreign
managers argue, contract law and the court system will become more
useful to outsiders. But that day has not yet arrived and most foreign
managers of successful foreign operations argue that attempting to
"force" the system simply does not work.
"Most of my Chinese suppliers rely on informal, personal relation-
ships to settle their disputes," one foreign manager stated. "For Chinese
managers, the system is built on a series of informal relationships. I am
most successful when I use the same style. Conversation and the constant
exchange of information are exponentially more successful than litiga-
tion. If I have to resort to the Chinese court system, I know that I have
already lost my case."
Rule 5: Negotiating 'price" is not the same as determining "cost"
One of the most difficult points in negotiating a contract between
foreign and Chinese enterprises comes in moving away from a simple
emphasis on "price" and toward the more complex understanding of
long-term "cost." "Many Chinese firms," says one foreign manager, "can
supply my inputs at a cheap price. But if the relationship bogs down or if
it gets entangled in the Chinese legal system, the long-term costs to a
project can multiply quickly."
"One of my most troublesome moments in negotiating a contract,"
says an American manager, "was facing the home office back in the
States. In the home office, all they were interested in was my bottom-line
hard figures. We went through nine versions of the final contract and
each version was more specific about delivery dates and price figures.
How could I explain that not all Chinese factories are alike, that not all
were related to my operation in the same way, and that the lowest price
might actually cost more in the long run?"
IV. MR. Li's SOLUTION
Mr. Li had a great deal of sympathy for the French manager and his
problems with the private enterprises. But he doubted that he could settle
the case in a way that would be satisfactory to the foreigner. The
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problems were overwhelming; the Chinese enterprises fell under different
jurisdictions and were located within different provinces and municipali-
ties. The French manager had an agreement that had been negotiated in
Tianjin, but this agreement was not very useful in Beijing and even less so
in Shanghai or Nanjing.
So Mr. Li used a more time-honored method. He called an old
schoolmate who now worked in the Shanghai development zone. A week
later he flew to Shanghai and explained the problem faced by the French
manager. Together, the two men worked out a way of bringing the illegal
production to a halt. The resin supplier in Tianjin would not be granted
the necessary transit permits to ship his product south. In turn, the pirate
firm would be cited for violation of environmental regulations, including
using potentially corrosive chemicals without the proper clearances.
In six weeks the problem was solved; the shipments of resins had
stopped and the pirate firms were no longer making the switches. Later,
when Mr. Li explained the solution to the French manager, he was not at
all surprised to see a cloud pass across the manager's face. "What about
the law? What about my contract? Are they worth anything?"
Mr. Li was not certain that he could offer an answer that would
satisfy the French manager. But he knew that sooner or later the French
manager would have to take into account the reality of China's emerging
system of commercial relationships and the vigorous but still underdevel-
oped system of contract law that is only now just beginning to take
shape.
